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Abstract: As we witness profound changes in the global economy, and as it becomes 
apparent that the so-called “Revived Bretton Woods System” may be nothing more than a 
temporary non sustainable financing of the US structural internal imbalance, favored by 
the global role of the dollar, which has increased the overall vulnerability of the global 
financial architecture, it’s worth revisiting the origins of the Bretton Woods conference, 
and pointing out the relevance for today’s framework of Keynes’ original 1942 plan for 
an International Clearing Union. In this note we explore the main characteristics of 
Keynes’ original plan, by revisiting his original writings between 1940 and 1944, and we 
outline its relevance to the current debate on the international financial architecture, 
We’ll argue that reforms of the international financial architecture should include 
anchoring the international monetary system on a sounder institutional ground. 
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I. Introduction 
In 1940 as World War II was still ravaging Europe, economists in both camps 
were at work to prepare the seeds of a new world monetary and financial order, which 
would have supported the post-war order. For the Nazi Germans, who were still hoping 
for victory, the stakes were to provide a substitute to the sterling area they were so 
willing to annihilate, for the Allies, the stakes were to counter the German propaganda, 
while also preparing to reconstitute on sounder basis a new post-war world order, able to 
support a renewed very intensive flows of international trade. Lord Keynes, was among 
the economists who would put his brilliant mind at work to first countering the German 
Funk-Schacht plan (1940-1942), the so called “German New Order”, and subsequently in 
1943-1944 to contribute to elaborating the basis of the post-war order, which led to the 
creation of the Bretton Woods Institutions in 1944. After an interwar period characterized 
by decreasing domination of the sterling and the increasing domination of the US dollar1, 
Keynes conceived the post-war order as a multipolar international monetary system, 
centered around an international “clearing union”. As it happened, the new world 
monetary order ended up centering on establishing the American dollar as the only 
dominating currency instead – supported by the US excedentary current account -  in a 
regime of fixed exchange rates, with the dollar pegged to gold at $35 a ounce.  The 
system was abandoned in 1971. As we witness profound changes in the global economy, 
and the raise of a multipolar integrated global economy, as it appears clear that so-called 
“Revived Bretton Woods System” as described in their influential paper by Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) (in which many countries, particularly in Asia, limit 
                                                
1 In their recent study, Eichengreen and Flandreau (2008) point out that the dominance of the US dollar 
started as recently as in the mid of the 1920s, preceding therefore the definitive fall of the influence of the 
Sterling. The interwar period was characterized by shifts between the US dollars and the Sterling. 
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exchange rate fluctuation against the dollar, accumulating as a consequence enormous 
reserves in dollars) may have been nothing more than a temporary non sustainable 
financing of the US structural internal imbalance, which has increased the overall 
instability of the global financial architecture, it’s worth revisiting the origins of the 
Bretton Woods conference, and pointing out to the relevance for today’s framework of 
Keynes’ original 1942 plan for an International Clearing Union. In this note we explore 
the main characteristics of Keynes’ original plan, by revisiting his original writings 
between 1940-1944, and we briefly outline its relevance to today’s current debate on the 
international financial architecture, stressing that reforms of the financial architecture 
should include reshaping the international monetary system.  
Section II covers the origins of Keynes Plan, the ‘secular problem’ of 
international imbalances, which had plagued the pre-war era of globalization, and 
Keynes’ ambition to set the international trade on sound monetary basis. Section 3 
provides a brief description of the key elements of Keynes Plan and the design of the 
International Clearing Union. 
Section IV addresses the relevance of Keynes Plan to the current debate on the 
international financial architecture, and lists three reasons that justify a call for an 
inclusion of the renewal of the international monetary architecture: 
1. Global imbalances have become structural to financial globalization, hereby 
increasing the risk of dramatic unwinding of the imbalances: the global role of 
the dollar as acted both as underlying condition for the development of global 
imbalances accumulated between 2001 and 20072, and the 2007-2008 
                                                
2 Reaching almost six percent of global GDP in 2007, this includes both deficits and surplus. It has been 
accompanied by a tripling of the total of foreign exchange holdings in US dollars ((DECPG calculations). 
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financial turmoil, with the following contagion to Europe and the emerging 
markets; 
2. Structural vulnerability and failures in the inter-bank markets are leading to 
the re-evaluation of the centrality of central banks, and central clearing. While 
Central Banks are stepping up to their renewed role, the international system 
is dangerously left orphan; 
3. The current “regulation” versus “laissez faire” debate is only a proxy for a 
more central question: the “adequacy” versus “inadequacy” of the institutional 
arrangements underlying the international exchanges. 
 
II. The “Secular International Problem” of Balance of Payment Imbalances 
Keynes’ proposal for the establishment of a new World Order went beyond the 
need for managing post-war relations, but originated from Keynes’ realization that the 
use of money in international trade has only “worked” for about “two periods of about 
fifty years each” in the past five hundred years (Keynes 1940, p. 21). Contrary to 
common wisdom Keynes’ work didn’t stem only from the need to overcome the limits of 
the interwar periods of unrestrained exchange rates flexibility. Keynes sees in the final 
break up during the war of the “international currency laissez-faire” not only a problem, 
but – in his own words - an “opportunity” to address a most fundamental question of the 
institutional weaknesses of the first era of globalization, which had been brought to an 
end by the two World Wars and the Depression. Keynes saw in the un-orderly 
international laissez-faire, based on the absence of a system of international payments, an 
institutional weakness. Keynes’s work was first and foremost aimed at institution-
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building. By suggesting an international clearing union, he was proposing to adopt to the 
international payments the same institutional arrangement ruling the payments within 
nations, and in particular the need of a banking clearing (operated by an international 
clearing bank). 
Keynes plan originated in his ambition to finally set the international trade on 
sound monetary basis, supporting the evolution toward an international division of labor 
and the exploitation of natural resources in foreign countries. Keynes considered such 
reform critical to the post-war world order. He blamed “impoverishment, and social 
discontent and even wars and revolutions” on the “secular international problem” of 
balance of payment imbalances (ibidem), pointing out that this failure can be traced to a 
“single characteristic”: almost all the international monetary settings used in the past 
five hundred years “throw the main burden of adjustment on the country which is in the 
debtor position on the international balance of payments” (p. 27).  
Keynes suggested a new institutional framework, in the form of a US-UK 
founded system of international clearing, the operation of which would facilitate re-
equilibration of global imbalances, by stressing the need of a symmetric rebalancing 
which would involve both countries, in debtor and creditor position. The aim was to 
secure creditor adjustment while maintaining debtor discipline. “The chief initiative” 
would rest on the country which finds itself in a creditor position against the rest of the 
world, hereby avoiding the “contractionist pressure against the world economy and, by 
repercussion, against the economy of the creditor country itself” (p. 47). Following the 
Keynesian logic, global imbalances should not lead to corrections through contraction of 
imports, but would be better dealt with by expansion of opportunities of exports. 
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The objective of Keynes analysis goes beyond the need to restore the international 
trade on a sound system of international payments, and extend to the need of providing a 
growing world with opportunities of growing flows of international investments. A sound 
system will require the means of distinguishing between “floating funds”, and genuine 
investments for developing the world resources (p. 53) – on the one hand – and on the 
other hand, distinguish between speculative movements of capital from deficiency 
countries to surplus ones, and movements of capital favorable to the equilibrium, which 
goes from surplus countries to deficiency countries.  
 
III. The Plan Keynes  
By the author’s own admission the Plan Keynes was an “ideal scheme”, 
“complicated and novel and perhaps Utopian” (p. 33). Nonetheless Keynes strongly 
believe it was “right”, and best corresponded to the new need of grounding international 
trade on the spirits of trust and international cooperation. Suggestively, he described it 
“as a measure of financial disarmament” (p. 57)). 
The Plan rested on the fundamental idea of generalizing the principle of national 
banking to international transactions, i.e. “the necessary equality of credits and debits, of 
assets and liabilities” (p. 44), by creating an international clearing. Central to this idea 
was the treatment of creditor countries. As Keynes puts it (p. 211): “the problems of the 
debtors can only arise if creditors are not choosing to make use of the purchasing power 
they have obtained”. Encouraging creditor countries to make use of this purchasing 
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power will mitigate problems encountered by countries in a debtor position. On the other 
hand, the plan would have allowed surpluses to be borrowed by debtor countries3. 
 
Keynes 1941 scheme suggests the creation by the US and the UK of a clearing 
institution, which would manage an international monetary unit (bancor), used in the 
settlement of international balances. The bancor would be based, as all other currencies 
at that time, on gold. The Clearing Union (C.U.) would entertain relations with all central 
banks of countries that wish to trade with members, and membership would be later 
opened to admission of other countries. Clearance of balances between Countries would 
be carried out by Central Banks through their accounts at the C.U. On the assets’ side of 
the its balance-sheet the C.U.’s would have its reserves and loans to central banks of 
member countries, while deposits on central banks (defined in bancor, as international 
currency issued by the C.U.) on the liabilities side. The imbalances between nations 
would therefore be reflected in the C.U.’s account. 
The Plan Keynes aimed at “mulilateralizing” the national imbalances, through 
their handling within an international banking institution. 
The management of imbalances would be operated through the following 
mechanism. Countries would be allowed overdraft facilities of a definite amount, to allow 
a time to let the country re-equilibrate its position. Every member state would be allowed 
to an amount of maximum debit balance determined by a quota related to its volume of 
trade. Members whose balance exceeds one quarter of the quota would be defined as 
                                                
3 This provision, which implies that the C.U. provisions also cover the need to a financial intermediation 
between surplus and debtor countries, is often neglected in the recent analysis of the Plan Keynes. We 
believe that a correct application of this provision would prevent possible inflationary effects of the Plan 
Keynes as described in Rossi (2007). 
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Deficiency/Surplus countries. The C.U. would discuss with Surplus countries that have 
exceeded half of the quota about measures to restore equilibrium (e.g. appreciation, 
expansion of domestic demand, reduction of barriers to import, loans to developing 
countries, payment of liquid reserves to a Reserve Fund)4. In the case of large debtors 
(for which the debit’s balance exceeds three quarters of the quota) further measures can 
be discussed, including the possible suspension of membership. 
The innovation of the plan lay in the treatment of Surplus Countries, and 
specifically in the following two features: 
- Deficiency countries would be allowed to borrow the balance of creditor 
countries.  
- The C.U. would discuss with Surplus Countries that have exceeded half of 
the quota, about measures to restore equilibrium.  
The centrality of this feature is also the central missing element of White’s 
proposal for a Stabilization Fund (which, amended, gave rise to the IMF).  
 
While in this note, we limit our exposure to the proposal of an international 
clearing union, the idea of an “International Bank” went however beyond the clearing 
union, to become the financial core of the architecture of a system of global economic 
governance. According to Keynes 1941 proposal, the Institution would play many roles 
(p. 91): 
                                                
4 The provisions of the Plan Keynes might seem to be ad odds with the management of chronically surplus 
countries like oil exporters. In reality, the mechanisms of the C.U. encourage countries to adjust, they also 
contain provisions for the handling of persistent surplus, by requiring payments into reserve funds, which 
can be borrowed by debtor countries. This mechanism amounts to a “multilateralized” version of the 
current development of sovereign wealth funds. A key difference is that the surplus of oil exporters 
countries would be reserved in bancors, instead of US dollars. These funds would therefore be reserved to 
fund international trade. Note however, that other provisions of the C.U. like devaluation and increase of 
imports could be considered, with also possible useful results to minimize “Dutch disease” effects. 
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- Finance an international body in charge of post-war relief and 
reconstruction, supplementing contributions from other donors. Overdraft facilities could 
be granted to this body, financed by countries having credit balances in their Clearing 
Accounts; 
- The Bank might finance an international body in charge of preserving 
peace; 
- It might set up an account in favor of international bodies charged with the 
management of commodities, and might finance stocks of commodities held by such 
bodies; 
- The Bank might link with a Board of International Investment (or a 
Development Corporation) and be closely associated with an anti-depression board. 
 
In the frenetic months that followed the White paper and preceded the Bretton 
Woods Conference, Keynes tried – without success – to address White proposal’s 
shortcomings by suggesting setting up a separate International Investment Scheme (p. 
399). As we know, the negotiations took a very pragmatic turn, and much of the visionary 
work of Keynes wasn’t reflected in the final discussions in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire. Nonetheless Keynes’ support for the new Bretton Woods institutions was 
clear and vocal, as he clearly saw in them the seeds of the new order. As it happened, 
these seeds never grew into an international monetary system, which was left into the 
“non-system” system depicted by Robert Triffin (1960). 
The reasons of Keynes’ failures where not only rooted in the fundamental 
antithesis between a “visionary plan”, and the pragmatic political approach that 
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dominated the international debate. Keynes also failed as his “market pessimistic views”, 
as expressed by Skidelsky (2005), based on belief of a superiority of rules versus 
discretion, was simply going against the renewed “esprit du temps”. Keynes’ plan was 
simultaneously too much ahead of his time, and behind the times, as the market oriented 
approach to economic institutions was back into fashion, after more than two decades of 
pessimism. Keynes Plan was stillborn. 
 
IV. Relevance of the CU’s proposal in the current international financial context 
a. The instability of the current international monetary architecture 
The current design of the international financial architecture is shaped by the 
regime of the “key currency”, which structure it into a core (the US), and a periphery 
(EU, Japan, and more recently Asia and Latin America). As currently set, the system 
allows for international imbalances to continue build up, so long as the periphery 
supports the accumulation of dollars. The apparent stability of this arrangement has 
prompted Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) to claim the existence of an 
implicit “Bretton Woods 2” regime. Other authors have voiced more skepticism and 
various degrees of concern, with Lawrence Summers depicting it as “balance of financial 
terror”. 
Recent years have seen a multiplication of authors that detect in the current 
economic evolution the seeds for a progressive implosion of the international “non-
system” of international payments, with the end of the sole domination of the dollar as 
global payment and reserve currency. Most of the new works stem from the debate 
around the sustainability of the US current account deficit, which developed since 1989. 
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Views diverge on the modalities and pace of progressive substitution of the dollar by 
other key currencies. Some authors see it as a very long “soft landing” process not bound 
to cause any sudden change in the dollar status, which will orderly lead to a multipolar 
currency system (Lipsky 2008), while others5 warn of the increased likelihood of an 
abrupt adjustment through a potential collapse of the dollar. Gourinchas and Rey (2005) 
points out that the “exorbitant privilege” of issuing international currency has lead, since 
the break up of the Bretton Woods System, to a transformation of the US from the World 
Central Banker, to the World Venture Capitalist, with high return risky investments on 
the assets side, and a considerably increased leverage ratio, hereby increasing the 
likelihood of an abrupt adjustment. 
 
b. The current international monetary architecture as one of the underlying 
conditions of the 2007-2008 global financial turmoil 
The current global financial turmoil raises the question of the role of the global 
imbalances, and the global role of the US dollar, as possible underlying conditions. 
Among the most vocal authors, Roubini (2007a) warns that the economic and financial 
model behind the so-called “revived Bretton Woods” was leading to “excessive monetary 
and credit growth, asset bubbles in stock markets, housing markets and other financial 
markets that will eventually lead to a build up of financial vulnerabilities”.  
But just how much the current situation was made possible by the international 
monetary arrangements as underlying factor?  
                                                
5 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), Eichengreen (2004), Goldstein and Lardy (2005), Krugman (2006), 
Summers (2006), Roubini (2007b).  
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The international role of the dollar helped sustained a lower interest rate in the US 
economy, indirectly helping creating the conditions that fed the housing boom, as in a 
deregulated financial environment, low interests and abundant credit have a tendency to 
spill over into non-traded goods sector, including property markets. Recent evidence 
suggests that international capital inflows to the U.S. (most notably accumulations by the 
Bank of Japan and the People’s Bank of China) have favored long term lower interest 
rates, offsetting the effect of factors pointing toward higher long term rates like the fiscal 
deficit and the tightening of monetary policy:  Warnock and Warnock (2006) estimated 
that had there been no foreign official flow into US government bond from 1984 to 2005, 
the 10 year yield would have been 90 points higher in 1996. On the other side, the high 
demand for US dollars in the 2005-2007 period, which kept increasing despite the 
ongoing deficit and the evident imbalances, helped delaying the need for the US to adjust 
the internal saving-investment imbalance, increasing likelihood of a sharper adjustment 
and the risk of a more severe crisis. The flow of funds from emerging markets hinged on 
the willingness of both central banks and private financial intermediaries to take on the 
risks which were being generated in both the external position of the US and the internal 
financing of indebted households. Quiet ironically, the mid-September 2008 collapse of 
the core financial institutions in the US has not stopped the process, but seem to have 
accelerated it, causing a strengthening of the dollar (which we believe might end up being 
as powerful as short-lived), and more recently even hints to a possible weakening of the 
Chinese Rembimbi. 
In addition, the status of the dollar is playing a role in transmitting the financial 
shock globally. As pointed out by Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba and Lopez-Salido (2008), the 
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key currency system heightens the inner vulnerability of the global financial architecture, 
as shocks emanating from the key currency country have the potential to lead to a global 
shock and can be a greater source of instability. Goldberg and Tille (2008) on the other 
hand show that the conduct of monetary policy in the center has substantial impact on 
countries at the periphery, even when direct trade links are absent. As Asian economies 
accumulated huge reserves by partially applying “mercantilist” policies that kept their 
exchange rate under evaluated, boosting exports, they submitted themselves to the risk of 
contagion:  with gross flows of trade remaining unchanged, the exposure to impact from 
international troubles was also substantially unchanged, and the generation of a 
substantive net outflow just entertained the illusion of protection against an international 
financial crisis. At the same time, excessive dependence on export led growth made 
emerging countries vulnerable to trade shocks. 
 
c. A renewed interest for the key role of central banking  
Lastly, the establishment with the C.U. of the seeds of an international central 
bank is coherent with the current rediscovery of the centrality of central banking. 
 Keynes’ pivotal idea of a clearing union lay in adopting for the international 
exchanges the same principles of two-tier banking that ruled most of the national 
systems. The originality of Keynes’ approach stems in his theoretical works on the nature 
of money and banking: Keynes’ work are first of all a search for understanding of the 
mechanics of the economic system, representing a superb example of the kind of “system 
analysis” that has fallen out of fashion in the last decades. Keynes’ central idea was that 
international exchanges should rely on the same sound banking structure that was ruling 
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exchanges within nations. History moved in the opposite direction. Not only the idea of 
grounding international trade on an international banking system never went beyond the 
level of debate among academics, but banking systems shifted away from the centrality 
of central banks, as large banking conglomerates and interbank markets developed in the 
last decades. It is interesting to observe that this disengagement of the central banks from 
the clearing activity contributed to propagate the sub-prime crisis: as recent evidence by 
Peydo and Iyer (2005) shows, the interbank market not only transmits, but amplifies 
shocks, increasing the fragility of the whole system over and above the initial shock. 
Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) documented this intrinsic vulnerability of the 
interbank market, by finding that in time of crisis surplus banks can strategically exert 
market power and exploit banks in difficulty – starting a “silent bank run’ - unless a 
discount window is available at the Central Bank. The stigma attached to the FED’s 
discount window, and the following bank’s very high reluctance to access it, might have 
caused the FED to loose its balancing influence over the interbank market (despite the 
FED’s effort to issue new discount windows during the 2007-2008 period). Rochet and 
Tirole (1996) concluded that the systemic risk in interbank market could be offset by 
centralized liquidity management, where the central bank acts as counterpart and 
guarantees finality of payments. 
An international clearing union could assume the same role of crisis prevention 
and management, which clearing houses6 assumed from mid 1800s (by functioning as 
“last resort” and issuing certificates which amounted to a form of deposit insurance) 
before the establishment of the FED in 1914.  
                                                
6 Clearing houses would clear payments among banks during normal times, and helped sustain bank’s 
liquidity and solvency during crisis (Gorton and Huang (2002)). 
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In 1963, the IMF started moving timidly in this direction by suggesting the 
introduction of Special Drawing Rights (SDR). By the time of their first allocation (1970) 
however the “Bretton Woods System” was already crumbling. The global shortage of 
reserves that the SDR were supposed to address never materialized, and the SDR never 
managed to gain significance. The following widespread development of lending to 
sovereign debtors by commercial banks ended up steering the evolution in a quiet 
different direction, and the SDR were left with the potential role of “a safety net for 
[improbable] future contingencies”7. While mitigating remarkably the risk of shortage of 
international reserve currency, this evolution left the international monetary system 
vulnerable to systemic coordination failures of commercials banks8, which caused the 
current global dry up of liquidity: on October 29, 2008 both the FED and the IMF 
resorted to new instruments, the FED expanding swap arrangements with countries 
outside the G10 group, and the IMF introducing a new short term financing facility. Both 
schemes do not however apply to more vulnerable developing countries.  
While the current financial turmoil has lead to the recognition that the 
development of the interbank market has not made redundant the need of a lender of last 
resort institution, little attention has been paid on the international monetary system. 
Attention should now turn to the vulnerabilities of the international (non-)system: 
probably too much emphasis (and hope) is currently being put on the effectiveness of 
coordinated action by Central banks. In the absence of a sounder global institutional 
grounding, and with currencies, including the US dollar, being left dangerously exposed 
                                                
7 Report of the Deputies of the Group of Ten, 1985, quoted in Polak (1998). 
8 Rochet and Vives (2004). 
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to very strong fluctuations, the global monetary architecture is being left vulnerable to 
possible chaotic unwinding of global imbalances. 
 
V. Conclusions: Keynes’ legacy and a new Bretton Woods 
The 2007-2008 global financial turmoil has prompted a renewed interest in the 
need to review the global financial architecture, and the role of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions in such a renewed framework. The Group of 20 has taken on this debate and 
planned to address it through working groups, which might echoes (at some level) the 
kind of preparatory works that led to the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, which had 
seen Keynes supporting the works of the UK treasury (through his plan) to counter the 
plans of the US Treasury. It is rather surprising that this work does not include at the 
moment any analysis of the future of global imbalances, whether they are sustainable, 
and whether their existence is desirable, and compatible with a less vulnerable 
international financial architecture. Failure to address at technical level this politically 
sensitive issue could lead to potentially incomplete reforms. 
At another level, the current global financial turmoil and its initial policy 
responses have spurred a debate on the need of more regulation, the role of the State and 
the Central Bank in managing the financial sector, and on the level at which the financial 
turmoil should lead to a review of the tenants of the “laissez faire” approach in the 
financial sector9. It is not doubtful that the crisis will give raise to a new body of research, 
some of which might lead to the rethinking of some of the received common wisdom. In 
this respect, we believe that the current “regulation” versus “laissez faire” debate is only 
                                                
9 Demirguc-Kunt and Serven (2008), and Caprio, Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2008) offer an excellent 
overview of these discussions, while also stressing the need for balanced and evidence-based approach to 
this, at times, heated debate. 
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a proxy for a more central question: the “adequacy” versus “inadequacy” of the 
institutional arrangements underlying the monetary and financial architecture of the 
global economy. While Keynes has sometimes been described as “market pessimist”, not 
least by one of his prominent biographers like Skidelsky (2005), Keynes’ approach is 
rooted in much more than the skepticism generated by the depression in the 30s: Keynes’ 
work is a response to the institutional weaknesses that have characterized the first era of 
globalization, and his work is foremost aimed at institution-building. Keynes monetary 
thought was elaborated in the 1920s, preceding the depression, and was chiefly devoted 
at understanding the nature of bank money (which proved to be very different than 
metallic money) and of modern banking activity. Keynes’ main legacy lays in his 
analysis of the adequacy of the institutional arrangements underlying both the national 
and international system of exchanges. The Plan Keynes is an attempt to ground the 
international system of trade a sound monetary institutional framework. More than sixty 
year after this failed attempt, Keynes Plan remains the chief blueprint for any further 
attempt. 
 
There is finally a very important lesson to be learned from Keynes 1940-1944 
activities. By putting his mind at work on the details of a post-war monetary order in the 
early days of 1940 already, when victory was still far away from being acquired, he 
stressed the need for adequate advanced preparations for the new order. Tomorrow’s 




Acharya, V., D. Gromb, and T. Yorulmazer (2008), Imperfect Competition in the 
Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking, Mimeo. 
Alessandrini, P. and M. Fratianni (2008), Resurrecting Keynes to Revamp the 
International Monetary System, mimeo. 
Calomiris, C. (2008), The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, and What’s Next, 
Mimeo, October 2008. 
Canzoneri, M., R. Cumby, B. Diba and D. Lopez-Salido (2008), The Macroeconomic 
Implications of a Key Currency, NBER Working Paper 14242. 
Caprio, G., A. Demirguc-Kunt and E. Kane (2008), The 2007 Meltdown in Structured 
Securitization. Searching for Lessons not Scapegoats. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 4756. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and L. Serven (2008), Are All the Sacred Cows Dead? Implications 
of the Financial Crisis for Macro and Financial Policies. The World Bank, 
Mimeo. 
Dooley, M., D. Folkerts-Laundau, and P. Garber (2003), An Essay on the Revived Bretton 
Woods System, NBER Working Paper 9971. 
Eichengreen, B. (2004), Global Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods. NBER 
Working Paper 10497. 
Eichengreen, B. and M. Flandreau (2008), The Rise and Fall of the Dollar, or When did 
the Dollar Replace Sterling as the Leading Reserve Currency?, NBER Working 
Paper 14154. 
Goldberg, L. and C. Tille (2008), Macroeconomic Interdependence and the International 
Role of the Dollar, NBER Working Paper 13820. 
Goldstein, M. and N. Lardy (2005), China’s Role in the Revived Bretton Woods System: 
A Case of Mistaken Identity. Institute for International Economics Working Paper 
Series 05-2. 
Gorton, G. and L. Huang (2002). Banking Panics and the Origin of Central Banking. 
NBER Working Paper 9137. 
Gourinchas, P.-O. and H. Rey (2005), From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist: 
the U.S. external adjustment and the exorbitant privilege, NBER Working Paper 
11563. 
Iwamoto, T. (1997), Keynes Plan for an International Clearing Union Reconsidered, 
Kyoto University. 
Keynes, J. M., Activities 1940-1944, Shaping the Post-War World: The Clearing Union, 
The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Royal Economic Society, Mac 
Millan and Cambridge University Press, Vol. XXV, London 1980. 
Keynes, J. M., Activities 1944-1946, The Transition to Peace, The Collected Writings of 
John Maynard Keynes, Royal Economic Society, Mac Millan and Cambridge 
University Press, Vol. XXIV, London 1980. 
Krugman, P. (2006), Will There be a Dollar Crisis?, mimeo. 
Lipsky, J. (2008), Perspective on the Global Economic Landscape and the Role of the 
Dollars, Address at the Brookings Institutions, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2008. 
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (2004), The Unsustainable US Current Account Position 
Revisited, NBER Working Paper 10869. 
 19 
Peydo, J. L. and R. Iyer (2005), How Does a Shock Propagate? A Model of Contagion in 
the Interbank Market Due to Financial Linkages, EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings 
Paper. 
Polak, J. J. (1996), Impasse on the Role of SDR, in J. A. Frenkel and M. Goldstein (eds), 
Functioning of the International Monetary System, International Monetary Fund, 
Vol. 2, 927-941. 
Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole (1996), Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, No. 4, Nov. 1996, Part 2. 
Rochet, J.-C. and X. Vives (2004), Coordination Failure and the Lender of Last Resort: 
Was Bagehot right after all?, Journal of the European Economic Association, 
Vol. 2(6), December: 1116-1147. 
Rossi, S. (2007), The Monetary-Policy Relevance of the International Settlement 
Institution: The Keynes Plan 60 Years Later. In: A. Giacomina and M.C. 
Marcuzzo (eds), Money and Markets: a Doctrinal Approach. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Roubini, N. (2007a), Asia is Learning the Wrong Lessons from Its 1997-98 Financial 
Crisis: The Rising Risks of a New and Different Type of Financial Crisis in Asia, 
mimeo, May 2007. 
Roubini, N. (2007b), The Instability of the Bretton Woods 2 Regime, mimeo, July 2007. 
Skidelsky, R. (2005), Keynes, Globalisation and the Bretton Woods Institutions in the 
Light of Changing Ideas about Market. World Economics, Vol. 6, N. 1, January-
March: 15-30. 
Summers, L. H. (2006), Reflections on Global Account Imbalances and Emerging 
Markets Reserve Accumulation, L.K. Jha Memorial Lecture, Reserve Bank of 
India, Mumbai, India, March 24, 2006. 
Triffin, R. (1960), Gold and The Dollar Crisis. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Warnock, F. E. and V. C. Warnock (2006), International Capital Flows and U.S. Interest 
Rates, NBER Working Paper 12560. 
 
